

W.E.B. Du Bois: From Japanophile to Apologist

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During the 2010–2011 academic year I taught African-American History at Japan Women's University with Professor Yoko Shirai. In a year filled with extraordinary classroom experiences, one memory stands out, the morning that our class compared and contrasted two markedly different civil rights activists, Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois. Washington, born a slave and reared in the post-Civil War South, was perhaps best known for his 1895 "Atlanta Compromise" in which he urged southern blacks to accommodate themselves to the rising tide of segregation and focus instead on learning a skill or trade in order to achieve "material prosperity." Du Bois, born in the postwar north and educated at Harvard University, urged African-Americans to fight segregation and seek educational equality. While I thought I knew which man our class most admired I nonetheless polled the students and their overwhelming choice, Booker T. Washington, stunned me. My home university, Fayetteville State University, is a historically black college founded in 1867, just two years after the end of the United States Civil War. Segregated for nearly a century, FSU remains a predominately African-American college and on my campus, faculty and students alike overwhelmingly admire Du Bois. Although hardly an historical footnote, Washington and his Atlanta Compromise have faded from prominence, obscured by Du Bois's long shadow. Given my "American" experience, I was struck by the response of my Japanese students who admired Washington's patience and were uncomfortable with Du Bois's penchant for confrontation.¹

When Shirai-sensei invited me to submit an essay for *Studies in English and American Literature* DuBois seemed a natural topic given the indelible memory that our brief classroom discussion provided. While I quickly chose a topic, I had no idea where my work would lead as I had only cursory knowledge of Du Bois's life and work. Early in my research I discovered that in 1936 Du

Bois visited Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Manchukuo, China, and Japan. These travels piqued my interest and became the focus for this essay. What I discovered from my study of Du Bois's writings, both the familiar and the forgotten, was how deeply he identified with Japan and how this, along with a curious blend of racial and economic determinism and historical blindness, produced a Japanophile that embraced Japan, championed her accomplishments, and defended her actions even when they became increasingly indefensible. As America and Japan drifted toward the war that neither sought, Du Bois's writings offered a prescient warning to policymakers while at the same time fueling his isolation at home.

The Making of a Japanophile

Du Bois's admiration for Japan stemmed in part from his personal identification with the nation's accomplishments and its struggles in a white dominated world. His semi-autobiographical 1940 classic *Dusk of Dawn* illustrated how Du Bois identified with Japan's accomplishments and its battle with racism. "In Japan," he explained, "the Meiji Emperors rose to power in the year I was born" and while the change in government heralded the birth of a new, modern, and powerful Japan "the United States refused to recognize" this new reality. This rejection of Japan, despite its many accomplishments, was analogous to the racism which Du Bois experienced at home. Despite his success, and the considerable accomplishments of Meiji Japan, race made both the man and the nation second class citizens. Du Bois also saw Japan and his boyhood New England as remarkably similar societies where the needs of the community came first and where each citizen played a part in improving the world around him. His description in *Dusk of Dawn* of the close knit, almost Puritan community in which he was raised is far more reminiscent of Japan than of the post-Civil War America of Du Bois's youth.²

Du Bois's affection for Japan also stemmed from an extraordinary historical blindness that first appeared at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Du Bois understood the war as a Japanese triumph over western imperialism when in fact the war, in which Japan gained suzerainty in Korea as well as control over South Manchuria, was a traditional imperialist power struggle. Du Bois's early writings indicate that he could not admit that while the war may have been

fought for national survival, the Portsmouth Treaty was written to further the Japanese Empire. Du Bois also failed to recognize that far from rejecting Japan, successive US administrations befriended the nation. This support culminated in an unofficial US-Japanese alliance by the turn of the century and consistent wartime support from the Theodore Roosevelt Administration.³

In the aftermath of the Qing collapse in China, many Americans turned their attention from Japan to the Middle Kingdom but the curious blend of personal identification and historical blindness that drew Du Bois to Japan prevented him from supporting China's new republican government. Conceding that a republican China might "test white supremacy," Du Bois soon became disillusioned by China's internal division and the blossoming of warlordism following Yuan Shikai's death in 1916. Forgetting Japan's own unhappy experience with warlord rule during the Sengoku period, Du Bois maintained that Japan was inherently more unified than China and argued that this unity allowed for successful resistance to the West. Forgetting as well the considerable role that missionaries played in modernizing Japan in the 19th century, Du Bois asserted that the new generation of Christian missionaries flocking to China were doing little more than buttressing Western imperialism. Though conceding the many benefits which missionary activity *could bring*, he also believed that "missionaries represent the oldest invasion of whites" and produced "docile Christian workers." This view of an overly pliant, submissive China combined with Japan's continuing triumphs and struggles with white imperial powers kept Du Bois focused on Japan instead of on Asia's other rising nation.⁴

While China succumbed to dictatorship, anarchy, and missionary exploitation, Japan honored its 1902 alliance with Great Britain and entered World War I. Successful in quickly sweeping the Kaiser's forces from China and the central Pacific, Japan faced its stiffest resistance from its allies at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. While France sought to permanently weaken Germany and Wilson struggled to ensure the success of his 14 Points, Tokyo wanted to confirm its wartime gains and also secure a racial equality clause in the League of Nations charter. Although Wilson and many white Americans viewed Japanese efforts to secure the racial equality clause with suspicion, Du Bois and the

African-American community welcomed her efforts. To galvanize support for racial equality and secure the interests of both Africans and African-Americans, Du Bois organized the first Pan African Congress. Made up of 57 delegates, 41 from European colonial Africa and 16 African-Americans, the Congress sought primarily to protect the native African population from Western imperialism. Despite his best efforts and those of the Japanese delegation, the Versailles Conference produced neither the racial clause nor protection against Western imperialism.⁵

Although Japan's efforts on behalf of racial equality won Du Bois's admiration, Versailles cost her dearly among Americans, both white and black. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, the one-time proponent of diplomatic compromise with Tokyo left Versailles disgusted by Japanese territorial demands while E. T. Williams, head of the State Department's Far Eastern division, maintained that "the spirit of Japan is that of Prussia, whom the Japanese leaders openly admire." On the floor of the US Senate, meanwhile, Illinois' Medill McCormick denounced Japanese foreign policy for its "consistent perfidy and aggression," and A. Philip Randolph, the leader of the powerful African American union the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, concluded that Japan was as much an imperial power as either England or France.⁶

If Versailles frayed the bonds between Japan and some leading African-Americans then the next major international peace conference, held in Washington DC between November 1921 and February 1922, went a long way toward restoring them. Designed as a way to contain Japanese expansion and protect the Open Door, the Washington Conference produced a naval arms limitation treaty which restricted the Imperial Japanese Navy's battleship fleet to 60% of the either the US Navy or the Royal Navy. The conference also produced an end to the 20 year old Anglo-Japanese Alliance, secured Tokyo's support for the US Open Door policy, and compelled Japan to relinquish its hold on Shantung province.⁷

Leading African-American figures, including Du Bois, correctly saw the conference as an Anglo-American attempt to contain Japan and few thought that Tokyo should oblige the West by scrapping a large part of their powerful battle fleet. In a November 1921 speech at Philadelphia's Olympia Theater, Marcus Garvey, the leading black separatist of the 1920s, declared that Japan

should disarm only after the colonial powers left Asia. James Weldon Johnson, the executive secretary for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the premier American civil rights organization both then and now, conceded that while disarmament might benefit Tokyo, Japan faced a wall of race-based opposition which made the policy dangerous. Du Bois's thinking clearly paralleled both Garvey's and Johnson's but both his arguments and prose were far more strident. Writing in the January 1922 edition of the NAACP magazine *The Crisis*, Du Bois maintained that Japan could not afford to disarm because it could trust neither British nor American motives. Like Garvey, he argued that only after Britain relinquished its physical hold on Chinese territory and the US had abandoned "her frantic efforts to force white debt slavery on China" could Japan "give up its armies and navies and seek the path of peace."⁸

It is relatively easy to understand Dubois's admiration for Japan up to the Washington Conference and for several years thereafter. As a man of letters, Du Bois appreciated Meiji Japan's near universal literacy and commitment to higher education. Given America's traditional support for the underdog, Japan's victory over its mammoth neighbors were likewise welcomed. And as an African-American, the sight of a people of color humbling the Kaiser's military and then demanding racial equality in Paris, had special meaning. At Versailles, however, he saw Tokyo fight tooth and nail for Shantung and a few scattered Pacific atolls while Great Britain and France dined on the carcass of the Ottoman Empire. At Washington he witnessed London cast aside its alliance with Japan and stand by while its onetime ally lost both Shantung and naval parity. If success in war increased his admiration for Japan then her struggles at the postwar conferences hardened his conviction that Western racism was holding her down and that Japan could not rely on the beneficence of any white nation.

The Making of an Apologist

During the 1930s Du Bois's personal identification with Japan and his inexplicable misreading of history turned the one-time Japanophile into an apologist. He believed, and believed absolutely, that Tokyo was on the defensive, especially in China where the West was poised to colonize parts of the

Middle Kingdom. Even as the Pacific War reached its terrifying end, Du Bois still claimed that the root cause of the war was “the century-old determination of Europe to dominate the yellow peoples for the benefit of the white.” This overriding fear of Western colonial domination led Du Bois to support Japan’s interwar Monroe Doctrine for Asia, a policy which, he insisted, would protect China from Western imperialism. His fear of further colonial expansion is inexplicable, however, given the Washington Conference’s patently anti-colonial policies, especially the new Nine Power Treaty, which pledged signatories to “respect the ‘sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.’” And while Du Bois rightly feared that Western powers might take advantage of the chaos and disorder that enveloped China after the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, the success of the 1926–1928 Northern Expedition, which ended warlord rule and placed Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party in control, should have put these concerns to rest.⁹

Instead of Western colonialism spurred on by Chinese weakness and disorder, Chinese unity, strength, and nationalism spurred on Japanese imperialism, which Du Bois consistently excused. After extending Nationalist control to Manchuria in 1930, Chiang Kai-shek made a bid to undermine Japanese control in the area by demanding treaty revision. This show of strength in turn led elements of Japan’s Kwantung Army to seize control of the entire region in 1931 and establish the puppet state of Manchukuo the following year. Du Bois’s support for Japan throughout the Manchurian affair was forceful, unfailing and immediate. In an extraordinary December 1931 essay published in *The Crisis*, Du Bois upbraided his countrymen for castigating Japan while supporting a generation of American military intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Nearly a year later, in the November 1932 edition of *The Crisis*, Du Bois defended Japan by arguing that her actions in Manchuria were no worse than America’s long-term occupation of Haiti. While correct on one level, Du Bois appears to have willfully ignored the seminal changes to America’s Latin American policy which accompanied Herbert Hoover’s victory in November 1928. Upon taking office, Hoover worked to end the policy of military intervention in Latin America, which previous US administrations had followed, and laid the foundations for the Good Neighbor policy. For Hoover and Secretary of State Henry Stimson, Tokyo’s actions in Manchuria

were doubly disturbing because they disregarded the Nine Power Treaty and flew in the face of the new American non-intervention policy, facts which Du Bois must have known but disregarded.¹⁰

Du Bois in Asia

Du Bois's support for Japan did not end with the passing of the Manchurian crisis and in 1936 the principled opponent of Western imperialism travelled to Manchukuo and then on to the Mother Country. Part of a larger tour which brought Du Bois to Germany and through Russia to China, the Manchukuo and Japanese legs of the tour were facilitated by a shadowy Japanese national named Hikida Yasuichi, the South Manchuria Railway Corporation (hereafter SMR), and the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, the precursor to the contemporaneous Japan Foundation and the prewar period's leading organization for the promotion of Japanese culture worldwide. Residing in the US since the early 1920s, Hikida made a living as a servant to a wealthy white family in the tony New York suburb of Forest Hill and at some point became a part time employee of the Japanese foreign ministry. Du Bois and Hikida had been in contact with one another since at least 1931 and from the spring of 1935 until his departure for Europe nearly a year later the two corresponded regularly. During his stay in Manchuria Du Bois was the guest of the SMR while the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai arranged his travels within the Home Islands.¹¹

Du Bois's brief stay in Manchukuo convinced him of the superiority of Japan's civilizing mission in Asia. Certain that the seizure of Manchuria was necessary to preempt the Western powers, he waxed eloquently on the puppet-state's economic development, urban planning, legal equality, and lack of "racial or color caste." He was also clearly struck by the number of Japanese leftists who worked for the SMR and made Manchukuo their home. Yosuke Matsuoka, whom Du Bois credited with developing Manchukuo, was a singularly impressive figure who was so well briefed about his distinguished American visitor that he made a point to tell Du Bois, a committed socialist, that "Japan, in some ways, was the most communistic of modern states." While in no way seduced by Matsuoka and the SMR, he clearly was seduced by Japan's success in modernizing its conquest, especially after arriving in China proper

where his life experience and willful historical blindness twisted his perceptions.¹²

Du Bois's conceptions of China and to some extent Japan are best understood through the early fragmentary drafts of a novel on China sketched out in 1935 in which he describes a nation "raped and enslaved" by Europeans. Du Bois recognized that Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party sought to free China from the yoke of European capitalism but with his death, he claimed, other new leaders "schooled at Harvard, Yale, and Oxford" rejected communism and in the process allowed Europe and America "to forge anew her industrial shackles on China." With Sun's death, he argued, China's only hope for redemption and national salvation rested with Japan.¹³

For Du Bois, Japan alone could protect China because only Japan had "out-fought Europe on land and sea" and had "out-bluffed them in politics." This success, which undermined "European supremacy in China . . . by smashing the legend of invisible Europe," inevitably caused "jealousy and resentment in China" and these feelings, twisted by the West, led many Chinese to "regard Japan as her real and main enemy and Europe and America as her friends." Chinese opposition in turn complicated Japan's drive to extend hegemony over all Asia, an effort which Tokyo undertook, Du Bois asserted, solely to counter "the menace . . . [that] Europe [posed] to the Yellow World." This menace, he believed, forced the Kwantung Army to seize "Manchuria knowing well that unless she did Europe would." Seeing his own life in Japan's national experience, Du Bois concluded that the Euro-American powers "face Japan with a unanimity . . . which has all of the too familiar earmarks of the Color Bar." For Du Bois and Japan, the white dominated world was both bewildering and dangerous. The Japanese people, he mused, could only wonder why the despoilers of China had become her supporters and why America, which excluded Asian immigration and rejected racial equality at Versailles, posed as China's defender. Japan's leaders, he claimed, had to be vigilant because of Euro-American hopes that a second Russo-Japanese war would end both the Soviet and Japanese "threats to European hegemony."¹⁴

Du Bois's Chinese novel also displayed keen insights and commendable detail regarding interwar Asia. He recognized the double standard evident in Far Eastern diplomacy which allowed Britain to control Hong Kong but made

Japan a pariah for taking Manchuria. He also realized that many Western diplomats believed that Soviet-Japanese tensions facilitated a balance of power in Northeast Asia that in turn contained both Soviet and Japanese expansion. His sharpest analysis, however, came when he turned his attention to social and political conditions in interwar Japan. Perhaps because so many blacks toiled in unbearable conditions in the rural South, Du Bois's novel focused on the plight of the Japanese peasantry, a people who "are not only poor and dissatisfied but are represented" by the army, which he maintained, "has become more democratic than the parliamentary system." In the army, an approving Du Bois observed, "peasant officers" are "championing the farmers" and using "assassination and violence to overthrow the power of capitalism." However much these killings undermined both Japanese democracy and her relations with the West, Du Bois justified them as essential to the class struggle. Paradoxically, violence drew Du Bois, a man of letters, closer to Japan.¹⁵

The fact that Du Bois envisioned the West as China's despoiler and Japan as her only savior made for a turbulent visit to China. Du Bois's writings make clear that he was deeply concerned about both the great chasm that separated China's rich and poor and the Chiang Kai-shek Administration's many shortcomings. But the most memorable moment of his stay came near the end of his visit when Du Bois's well-earned, but not always well-received penchant for directness, led to a minor diplomatic crisis. By the end of his time in China Du Bois had grown certain that the Nationalists' single-minded focus on Japan, rather than Europe, was the great geopolitical problem of the modern Far East. In an extraordinary speech delivered to the Chinese Bankers Club in Shanghai shortly before he left for Japan, Du Bois scolded his hosts for despising "Japan more than Europe when you have suffered more from England, France, and Germany." His remarks were so inflammatory that many audience members concluded that Du Bois was a paid Japanese agent of influence. Du Bois, meanwhile, left China so disgusted that he equated Chiang Kai-shek with Booker T. Washington and China with the insidious "Uncle Toms" that he so despised at home.¹⁶

Given Du Bois's clear attention to historical detail as well as contemporary Far Eastern affairs, his conclusions regarding Sino-Japanese relations and his actions in China are difficult to countenance. While he correctly noted that

European powers had threatened Chinese sovereignty for generations, he somehow could not come to grips with the notion that Japan had replaced the West as China's greatest threat. After taking Manchuria in 1931, Japanese civilian and military strategists attempted to safeguard Tokyo's conquest by creating buffer states and demilitarized zones in North China. To that end, Tokyo sponsored Mongolian separatist groups and forced Chiang to conclude the humiliating Hu-Umezo Agreement in 1935, which established a vast demilitarized zone in North China.¹⁷

While Du Bois's curious reading of history and Asian travels reinforced his negative impression of the Middle Kingdom, they served to strengthen his decades-old affection and admiration of Japan. Thanks to the work of Hikida Yasuichi and the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, Du Bois was the center of attention in Japan. After landing in Nagasaki, Du Bois traveled to Kobe and then Osaka where his address, with its unctuous platitudes to Japanese virtues, bore no resemblance to his jarring speech before the Chinese bankers. The speech reached a newspaper audience of some five million and assured Du Bois increasing attention as he made his way to Kyoto and then to Tokyo. During his week in the capital, Du Bois stayed at the Frank Lloyd Wright designed Imperial Hotel and met with faculty and students at Todai, Waseda, and Senshu Universities. He toured Ueno Park, the Meiji Shrine, and the grounds of the Imperial Palace and particularly enjoyed both a geisha party hosted by the foreign ministry and a night at the Kabuki Theater.¹⁸

Du Bois's visit cemented his affection for Japan but also put him increasingly at odds with many Americans, both white and black. Even before the start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 many Americans found Du Bois's favorable comments about Manchukuo and Japan beyond the pale. After embracing Black Nationalism in 1934 Du Bois resigned his post at *The Crisis* and in a clear rebuke to their former editor, *The Crisis* carried a lengthy July 1937 speech from the noted writer and poet Langston Hughes in which he assailed "the Military Party in Japan . . . [for] their savage treatment of Koreans and Chinese." In direct contradiction to Du Bois, Hughes maintained that in Manchukuo, Japanese authorities "attempt . . . to force the Chinese of Manchuria to work and fight under Japanese supervision." Two months later, as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident morphed into an undeclared second Sino-

Japanese War, *The Crisis* carried additional stories that both challenged Du Bois's contention that European imperialism was the greater threat to China as well as one that predicted a wholesale Japanese attempt to extinguish China's sovereignty. Du Bois's pro-Japanese stance was so extreme that one long-time NAACP supporter wrote to ask him about rumors that he was a paid Japanese propagandist. Du Bois fired off a terse reply in which he asserted that while he was not unsympathetic to China's plight he "believed in Japan" and saw in her "the very best agent" for ending the Western domination of Asia. While his was not the lone voice in the African-American community supporting Japan, increasingly it was the shrillest.¹⁹

Du Bois and the Road to War, 1938 to 1941

As the Sino-Japanese War intensified and US-Japanese relations deteriorated, Du Bois became both Cassandra and an apologist for Japan, the nation he continued to perceive as the champion of all people of color. The Roosevelt Administration responded to the war in China with a multifaceted containment policy that sought to limit Japanese expansion. The first pillar of containment, economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek, culminated in billions of dollars in wartime Lend-Lease aid for Chiang beginning in 1941. Containment's second pillar, military deterrence, led to a mammoth naval expansion program, the repositioning of the Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii and a military buildup in the Philippines. Containment's final pillar, economic sanctions, began with the 1938 moral embargo and ended in the summer of 1941 when the US froze Tokyo's assets and ended all trade with Japan. On one level American containment was a remarkable success as Chinese armies, unlike 1894–95 or 1931, remained in the field against Japan. On another level, containment and continued Chinese resistance influenced the Konoe cabinet in September 1940 to both join the Axis Alliance and absorb northern French Indochina and take the southern portion of the French colony the following July.²⁰

Du Bois watched the unfolding crisis in Japanese-American relations from a perspective that brought both fresh insight and tired racial and economic determinism. As early as 1937, he predicted that US policy in Asia and the Pacific "has . . . almost forced [Japan] into the lap of Fascist Germany and

Italy,” and ten months before the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, he again correctly predicted that American diplomacy would throw “Japan into the arms of Germany and Italy.” His conclusion that Japan sought American friendship but was driven into the Axis Alliance surely oversimplified events but was not incorrect. For a nearly a year the Nobuyuki Abe and Mitsumasa Yonai cabinets attempted a rapprochement with Washington which Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his assistant, Stanley Hornbeck, consistently spurned. Again, in 1940, as Washington ramped up economic sanctions, Du Bois correctly predicted that draconian export restrictions would “lead to virtual and even open war with Japan.”²¹

Du Bois’s single-minded focus on race and economics on the other hand led him to mistakenly conclude that race hatred and the needs of American capital determined American Far Eastern diplomacy. To be sure, while leading policymakers such as Stanley Hornbeck had an aversion for Japan so profound that one colleague called it a “pathological hatred of Japan and things Japanese,” racism did not drive American policy. Because race was the defining factor in his life, however, Du Bois assumed that race hatred must explain American policy toward Japan. For Hornbeck, a Sinophile and career diplomat, hatred for Japan was not rooted in race but instead in Japanese actions in China, violations of existing treaties, and the hobbling of Japanese democracy by the same military elements that Du Bois so admired. When Du Bois singled out Henry Stimson, FDR’s newly appointed secretary of war, as one who “hates Japan,” he could not have been further off the mark. Like Hornbeck, Stimson had a clear brief against Japan, but not the Japanese people. When Du Bois insinuated that Tokyo’s commercial successes in occupied China or Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox’s “love . . . [of] Big Business,” drove US policy in Asia, he simply had ignored the immense threat that the gathering Axis coalition posed to the republic.²²

While Du Bois was right about a great number of things, in the end, rather than soberly assess the reason for the progressive deterioration in American-Japanese relations he could only lash out at Anglo-American Far Eastern diplomacy. In the final weeks of peace, Du Bois still reduced the origins of the oncoming war to economics and race. Less than two months before Pearl Harbor he claimed that Anglo-American “fear of losing to Japan the immense

profit of exploiting Asia,” rather than national security, governed American policy. In the same editorial he opined that Japanese control of China “could not possibly have such frightful results as the exploitation of Asia by Europe has already had.” While London and Washington frantically prepared to defend Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines, Du Bois urged “England and America [to] get out of Asia.” Even if he could not admit it to himself, he must have known from his travels as well from Japan’s inability to defeat China that war with America could only end in Japan’s ruin. Seventy-three years old on the eve of the war, Du Bois may have realized that the parallels between his life and Japan’s national experience were reaching a terrible, futile end. He would not live to see the color bar — institutionalized racial discrimination — collapse and 73 years after patriots overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate in order to save Japan from the West, their descendants were on the verge of leading the empire into a war it would not survive. These realizations were simply too frustrating for W.E.B. Du Bois to bear.²³

Throughout the first four decades of the 20th century American diplomats approached Japan as they did any other nation. Race played a factor in this approach, but so too did national security, economic and humanitarian concerns, and a gamut of human emotions. These myriad factors in turn largely explain the convoluted and often tumultuous Japanese-American relationship from 1900 to 1941. Du Bois, however, approached Japan from a very different perspective. For this man of color living in a white dominated nation and an Anglo-American dominated world, “Japan was above all a country of colored people run by colored people for colored people.” This approach obviated the need to critically appraise Japanese actions and largely explains W.E.B. Du Bois’s linear progression from Japanophile to Japanese apologist.²⁴

Notes

1 David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. Du Bois, 1868–1919: Biography of A Race* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1993), 291; Susan D. Carle, *Defining the Struggle: National Organizing for Racial Justice, 1880–1915* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 174.

2 W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011; originally published by

Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1940), 5, 9, 52; *Du Bois, W.E.B. (William Edward Burghardt), 1868–1963. America, New Negro, and Japan, 1937. W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries.*

3 Marc Gallicchio, *The African-American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 7; *Du Bois Papers (MS 312)*, The Meaning of Japan, March 12, 1937; Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 23; W.E.B. Du Bois, “The African Roots of War,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, 115, no. 5 (May 1915): 707–714; Sidney Pash, *The Currents of War: A New History of American-Japanese Relations* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 4–12 and 14–17.

4 Gallicchio, 16; Du Bois, *The Meaning of Japan*, 10; For Du Bois’s difficult encounter with mainstream Christianity see Edward J. Blum, *W.E.B. Du Bois, American Prophet* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) and Philipp Luke Sinitiere, “Of Faith and Fiction: Teaching W.E.B. Du Bois and Religion,” *The History Teacher*, 45, no. 3 (May 2012): 421–436; For Du Bois’s intense spirituality see Blum, 129–130; For Du Bois and Missionaries see W.E.B. Du Bois et. al, *The World and Africa and Color and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 256 (Originally published in separate volumes by Harcourt and Brace which published *Color and Democracy* in 1945 and Viking which published *The World and Africa* in 1947) and Phil Zuckerman, “The Irreligiosity of W.E.B Du Bois,” in Edward J. Blum and Jason R. Young, eds. *The Souls of W.E.B. Du Bois: New Essays and Reflection* (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 2009), 7.

5 Yuichiro Onishi, “The New Negro of the Pacific: How African Americans Forged Cross-Racial Solidarity with Japan, 1917–1922,” *The Journal of African American History*, 92, No. 2 (Spring, 2007): 194–202; Gallicchio, 20–21 and 25; Karin L. Stanford, ed., *If We Must Die: African-American Voices on War and Peace* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 113.

6 Pash, 43; Etsuko Taketani, *The Black Pacific Narrative: Geographic Imaginings of Race and Empire between the World Wars* (Hanover NH: Dartmouth University Press, 2014), 25–26.

7 Pash, 50–59.

8 Robert A Hill ed., *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers*, IV, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 174; Reginald Kearney, *African-American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 60–62; W.E.B. Du Bois, Opinion, *The Crisis*, January 1922, 103–104.

9 *W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312)*, The Meaning of Japan, March 12, 1937; Ibid., *Winds of Time*, August 12, 1945; W.E.B. Du Bois et. al, *The World and Africa and*

Color and Democracy, 246; Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts, 1964), 644; Francis L. Broderick *W.E.B. Du Bois, Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), 133.

10 Pash, 74–80; Gallicchio, 63–66; For information on Hoover's Latin American policy see Earl D. Curry, *Hoover's Dominican Diplomacy and the origins of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Garland, 1979) and Alexander DeConde, *Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1951), 86; *The Crisis*, November 1932, 363.

11 Gerald Horne, *Race War!: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 57; Masato Kimura and Toshihiro Minohara, *Tumultuous Decade: Empire, Society, and Diplomacy in 1930s Japan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), xix, and 17; Kearney, 83–84; Gallicchio, 103; Lewis, *Fight for Equality* 393; Taketani, 156–57.

12 Ibid., 160–165; *W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312)*, *A forum of fact and opinion*, February 5, 1937; Reginald Kearney, "The Pro-Japanese Utterances of W.E.B. Du Bois," *Contributions in Black Studies* 13, no 7 (January, 1995): 212.

13 *W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312)*, *Fragments of novel on China, 1935 ?*. Although the draft of the novel is dated 1935, some or all of the writing was likely completed after the visit to Manchukuo as Du Bois mentions a meeting with Matsuoka.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Lewis, *The Fight for Equality*, 413–414.

17 James Buckley Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–38* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 217 and 303.

18 *W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312)*, *W.E.B. Du Bois in Japan with Tokyo University faculty*, 1936; Ibid., Tentative Schedule in honor of Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois's visit in Tokyo, December 1936; Lewis, *The Fight for Equality*, 414–415.

19 *The Crisis*, September 1937, 272; Ibid., October 1937, 303 and 317.

20 Pash, chapter 4, *passim*.

21 *W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312)*, The Meaning of Japan, March 12, 1937. Ibid., As the Crow Flies, November 11, 1939; Ibid., As the Crow Flies, February 24, 1940; Pash, 147–157.

22 Kearney, Pro-Japanese Utterance, 211; Eugene Dooman Oral History, 105, Butler Library, Colombia University Rare Books and Manuscripts, New York, New York; *W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312)*, As the Crow Flies, July 5, 1940; Du Bois possessed a strong and long-term dislike for Stimson. In a 1933 draft of an essay written for *The Crisis*, entitled "Listen, Japan and China," Du Bois called Stimson a stooge, who fronted for "The real rulers of the world today . . . blood-sucking imperial tyrants

who see only one thing in the quarrel of China and Japan and that is a chance to crush and exploit both.” When Stimson reached out privately to Du Bois in January 1940 to secure his support for economic sanctions Du Bois publicly rejected him a month later in his February 24, 1940 *As the Crow Flies*; Ibid., *As the Crow Flies*, February 3, 1940.

23 W.E.B. Du Bois Papers (*MS 312*), *As the Crow Flies*, October 11, 1941.

24 Kearney, *African-American Views*, 89.